Jurisdiction: Exhaustion of Remedies and the Status of Tribal Courts by Salmon, Sue
American Indian Law Review
Volume 4 | Number 2
1-1-1976
Jurisdiction: Exhaustion of Remedies and the
Status of Tribal Courts
Sue Salmon
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sue Salmon, Jurisdiction: Exhaustion of Remedies and the Status of Tribal Courts, 4 Am. Indian L. Rev. 295 (1976),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol4/iss2/7
JURISDICTION: EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES AND
THE STATUS OF TRIBAL COURTS
Sue Salmon
The status of Indian tribes as a part of the American government
and society has caused constant problems since the United States
Supreme Court considered the problem in Worcester v. Georgia1
in 1832. This note considers the problem of tribal status as reflected
in the federal courts' application of the exhaustion of remedies doc-
trine, with respect to tribal courts.
In defining tribal legal and political status, the courts have been
faced with assimilating many conflicting federal policies: the pre-
serving of tribal culture and the independent political character of
the tribes,2 a duty to protect the Indian nations as dependent peo-
ples,' and a concern with extending protection of individual civil
rights to Indians.4 The tribes were originally separate sovereign na-
tions antedating federal and state governments. From the first Euro-
pean settlements in New England, the Indians were brought under
the jurisdiction and control of the United States' government by
conquest. In return for retaining their tribal identity, receiving fed-
eral monetary aid, food and medical assistance, and grants of land,
the Indians were forced to give up a portion of their independence in
the form of external sovereignty, that is, they were no longer allowed
to declare war nor treat with foreign countries as independent na-
tions.' The federal government thus assumed a position of guardian
to the tribes, with an obligation to protect their remaining internal
tribal sovereignty from encroachment by itself or the states.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to express this obligation
in Worcester Y. Georgia, supra. In that case, the state of Georgia
sought to impose state laws upon Cherokees living on Indian lands
within the state. In Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, the Cherokee
Nation was described as a "distinct community ' 6 with its own terri-
tory, and immune from the laws of Georgia, the state in which the
reservation was located, except as expressly authorized by treaties,
acts of Congress, or the Indian nation itself.1 Because of its peculiar
status, all dealings with the tribe would be performed by the federal
government alone.8 Tribal status was thus designated as being some-
where between that of the states and the federal government. This
opinion has been construed to support the definition of the tribes as
quasi-sovereign political entities not subject to the laws of the states
in which they reside, except as authorized by Congress,9 and with all
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inherent rights of internal sovereignty, save only the restrictions
placed thereon by the federal government.10 The practical result of
the decision was that the internal governing of the Indians was left
to the tribes, including the power to determine their own form of
government, draft qualifications for administrative officials and pro-
vide for the manner of their election and removal, and promulgate
laws for the ordering of their society.:" While the problem of tribal
status thus seemed neatly settled, later legal developments placed
many qualifications on the above doctrine so that tribal status often
varies from case to case.
In contrast to this policy of favoring tribal autonomy, congres-
sional policy has been the assimilation of the tribes into the "main-
stream of American society.' 2 The congressional goal has been to
see all Indians as full-fledged members of American society with all
attendant individual rights. 3 The process has been gradual, begin-
ning with the granting of full citizenship to Indians as a result of
Section 1401 (a) (z) of Title 8 of the United States Code.'4 This
has been continued with the passage of such bills as the 1953 amend-
ments of sections 1151 and 1.61 of Title 18, in which state juris-
diction was extended over crimes and civil actions involving Indians
in certain areas of Indian country in California, Minnesota, Nebras-
ka, Oregon, and Wisconsin.'5 The transition has been a gradual one
in which the states have been encouraged to assume the burdens of
jurisdiction over the tribes as soon as the educational and economic
status of each tribe permits the change without working hardship
on the tribe.' 6
Recent emphasis on assimilation has been prompted by the
courts' concern over protection of individual Indian rights. In that
area, individual Indians have been caught in a "legal no-man's
land.1'7 As discussed above, the tribes are not states,' 8 and they are
not usually treated as arms of the federal government.0 No state or
federal laws, including the Constitution and Bill of Rights, are ap-
plicable to Indians, unless expressly applied by Congress.20 To re-
solve the resulting legal hiatus in which tribal members were denied
civil rights unless granted by their tribal government, Congress
passed the Indian Bill of Rights2' with the purpose of "vindication
in federal courts if necessary of civil rights heretofore denied tribal
members. 22 The Indian Bill of Rights, which does not include all
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, is the result of a compromise
between the conflicting congressional policies discussed herein:
tribal autonomy versus concern over the individual rights of tribal
members a The efficacy of the compromise in achieving its twin
goals has been heightened by its careful application by the courts.
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Exhaustion of Remedies Doctrine Applied in Tribal Courts
The nature of Indian nation sovereignty is important in a discus-
sion of exhaustion of remedies in tribal courts. It directly affects the
route a tribal case must follow on its way to federal court and the
scope of application of the exhaustion doctrine along the way. The
doctrine is applicable only where tribal courts and administrative
agencies have jurisdiction over the suits and Indian parties. The
jurisdiction will depend on the authority of the tribe to confer it on
those courts and agencies. 24 This authority is an inherent power of
internal sovereignty.
Williams v. Lee25 is often relied on by courts in a discussion of
exhaustion of remedies as affecting the scope of tribal and state
jurisdiction. In this case, Lee, the plaintiff and a non-Indian, was
the operator of a general store on a Navajo reservation. He brought
suit against Williams and his wife, both Indians living on the res-
ervation, for goods sold to them on credit. The defendants moved
to dismiss on the grounds that jurisdiction properly belonged in the
tribal court, rather than in state court.26 The Supreme Court held
that the exercise of state jurisdiction would undermine tribal au-
thority over reservation affairs.m 7 While citing the autonomy policy
of Worcester, the Court noted that Congress had modified this
policy, notably where essential tribal relations were not involved and
the rights of individual Indians were not jeopardized, as in suits by
Indians against non-Indians in state court and state criminal juris-
diction over crimes between non-Indians on reservation lands.28 The
determining factor in the decision about whether to allow state juris-
diction was to be whether such action would interfere with the right
of Indians to govern themselves.29 The plaintiff, although not an
Indian, was subject to the tribal courts because his business was con-
ducted on Indian lands and with Indians.30 This strict insistence on
tribal court independence supports an inference of an exhaustion of
remedies doctrine applying to removal of such cases to federal court.
Following Williams, one of the first considerations of the exhaus-
tion doctrine was in Dodge v. Nakai3 1 At issue in that case was
whether exhaustion of available tribal remedies was an implied con-
dition for reliance on Title II of the Indian Civil Rights Act (z8
U.S.C. § 1303) in federal court. The Court found exhaustion to be
well supported as a general rule on three grounds32: (1) such action
would support the congressional policy of investing tribal govern-
ments with responsibility for their own affairs;33 (2) an independent
tribal judiciary would be enhanced by placing primary responsibility
for vindication of Indian civil rights with the tribe, and (3) such
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action would insure federal court intervention only when local ac-
tions could not be handled by the tribal court. The Court declined to
enforce the exhaustion requirement in this instance, however, in
order to avoid a multiplicity of suits.3
4
As in Dodge, many recent cases dealing with exhaustion of tribal
court remedies are suits involving the Indian Bill of Rights, or the
Indian Civil Rights Act. 5 Two cases, O'Neal v. Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, 6 and United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobel3 7 will serve
to illustrate the problems encountered here. In O'Neal, the plaintiff
alleged federal court jurisdiction under the Indian Bill of Rights for
alleged wrongful seizure of his cattle by order of the Junior Court
of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe based on the foreclosure of a
loan made by the tribe to the plaintiff.8 In Cobell, plaintiff was
appealing a temporary restraining order staying the transfer of child
custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus sought by the Indian
father after a divorce upon refusal of the mother to surrender
the children. In both cases, additional tribal remedies were
available. In O'Neal, the plaintiff contended he should not be
required to exhaust his tribal remedies because other non-In-
dian citizens were not required to exhaust their state court
remedies when bringing civil rights suits in federal court., The
Court agreed with plaintiff's authorities, but held, as concerning
Indian civil rights, that Congress had decided the preferred method
of protecting Indian rights was by "maintaining the unique Indian
culture and necessarily strengthening tribal governments. ' 40 The
Court also noted that the plaintiff had efficacious tribal remedies
remaining in either an appeal to the Cheyenne River Tribe Superior
Court or an original suit in the same superior court upon dismissal
of the instant suit.41 It was noted that the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine was not an inflexible requirement.
In each case, a balancing process was necessary, weighing the need
to immediately determine alleged deprivations of individual rights.42
This flexibility was demonstrated in the Cobell case. Although
plaintiff father had two alternative tribal remedies available,4 the
Court refused to require exhaustion, citing the particular remedies
as "ineffective" and "meaningless. 44 The Court held that mere
availability of tribal remedies in theory did not automatically result
in a decision that plaintiff had failed to exhaust remedies. 45 The
tribal remedies, then, must not only be available but effective. Other
reasons cited in various cases for refusal to apply the exhaustion doc-
trine to the particular case under consideration have been inadequate
tribal court structure to deal with the case,40 avoidance of multi-
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plicity of suits in federal court,47 and when use of tribal procedures
would result in great delay of plaintiff's case.
48
Conclusion
In applying the exhaustion of remedies doctrine to tribal cases in
federal court, the courts have attempted to follow the doctrine as it
is applied to state courts. Several factors prevent blanket application
in this manner to Indian tribes. The special quasi-sovereign status
of the tribes, as with the sovereignty of the states, must constantly be
balanced with the congressional and constitutional policy of imme-
diate adjudication of individual rights. A great determining factor
in the Indian cases, though, is the great variance in the size, struc-
ture, and quality of the judicial structures among the tribes.
49 It
would work great hardship on a defendant to require him to exhaust
his tribal remedies in a situation as found in McCurdy v. Steele.50
In that case, the plaintiff was a member of the Goshute Tribe, which
had no judicial arrangement to try civil cases and was forced to share
a judge with another tribe regarding any civil or criminal matters as
they occurred, often resulting in great delays in determination of
Goshute cases.51 In comparing this with the excellent tribal judicial
system of the Navajo Tribe, as relied upon in Williams v. Lee, the
federal courts have done well in dealing with this difficult problem.
The present approach to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine should
be continued in order to avoid inequities to less culturally advanced
tribes, which are neither ready to submit to state jurisdiction nor
organize their own judicial system.
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